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THE RESPONSIBLE USE OF ANIMALS
IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Edwin Converse Hettinger
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C

arl Cohen's defense of the use of animals
for biomedical research in The New
England Journal of Medicinel raises most of
con
the major issues in the moral controversy concerning human treatment of nonhuman animals. It
exhibits the major lines of attack against both
animal rights advocates (such as Tom Regan 2 ) and
utilitarian animal-liberationists (such as Peter
Singer!!). It is also a showcase of the most common
mistakes made by those who seek to defend the
current human use of animals.
obliga
Cohen argues that although we do have obligations to animals - for example, not to be cruel to
them - we have no obligations to animals based
on their rights to such treatment. According to
Cohen, the biomedical use of animals does not
violate their rights, since by their very nature
animals cannot have rights. Cohen rejects the util-
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Do All Humans But No Animals Have Rights?

itarian argument that much of the biomedical use
of animals is an unjustified subordination of the
most vital interests of animals to relatively minor
human concerns. He thinks a proper utilitarian
assessment of animal experimentation counsels
the increased use of animals in biomedical
research, rather than its reduction or elimination.
Because there is a stronger justification for animal
use in biomedical research than for any other use
of animals (e.g., for food or clothing), Cohen
argues that opponents of animal experimentation
must adopt what he feels is the absurd position
which opposes all use of animals.
In response, I argue that Cohen cannot secure
the rights of severely retarded humans while
denying that psychologically sophisticated animals
have rights. Cohen can reach his conclusion that
we should increase our biomedical use of animals
only because (1) he counts animal pain and suffering as less important than equivalent human
pain and suffering, (2) he ignores the frequent
misuse of animals in biomedical research, and (3)
he overlooks the abundant alternatives to current
animal experimentation. I propose the limited
use of animals based on their degree of psychological sophistication as a consistent and attractive
alternative to the extreme views of both Cohen
and his absolute prohibitionist opponents. I close
by suggesting that only if researchers would be
willing to experiment on severely retarded
humans at comparable levels of psychological
sophistication are their experiments on animals
morally permissible.

Cohen argues that only humans beings can have
rights.
Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended,
only among beings who actually do, or can,
make moral claims against one another.
Whatever else rights may be, therefore, they
are necessarily human; their possessors are
persons, human beings. (p. 865)
Cohen is correct in maintaining that rights
cannot arise unless there exist moral agents for
whom these rights claims make sense. To say that
some being has a right is to say (at least in part)
that some other being has obligations to treat the
right holder in certain ways specified by that right.
So if there were no beings more cognitively and
morally capable than pigs or dogs, there would be
no rights.
However, the fact that rights claims require the
existence of duty bearers does not imply that only
those duty bearers can have rights. Even Cohen
would grant that human infants have rights, yet
they are not duty bearers. Thus, some creatures
possess rights despite being unable to invoke them
against others or to recognize and respect others'
rights.
Cohen attempts to avoid this objection by
shifting his criterion of rights possession to the
capacity for being a moral agent, rather than
actually being a moral agent.
Animals ... are not beings of a kind capable of
exercising or responding to moral claims.
Animals therefore have no rights, and they
can have none.... The holders of rights must
have the capacity to comprehend rules of
duty.... (p. 866)
However, most people would grant that severely
retarded humans have rights (Cohen does), and
yet they do not have "the capacity to comprehend
rules of duty." Thus if having the capacity to be a
duty bearer is necessary for the possession of
rights, then severely retarded humans cannot have
rights.
Cohen responds to this point with his talk of
''kinds.''
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The capacity for moraljudgment that
distinguishes humans from animals is not a
test to be administered to human beings one
by one. Persons who are unable, because of
some disability, to perform the full moral
functions natural to human beings are
certainly not for that reason ejected from the
moral community. The issue is one of kind.
Humans are of such a kind that they may be
the subject of experiments only with their
voluntary consent. The choices they make
freely must be respected. Animals are of such a
kind that it is impossible for them, in
principle, to give or withhold voluntary
consent or to make a moral choice. What
humans retain when disabled, animals have
never had. (p. 866)

lacking the ability to realize that capacity. But why
should we accept such an attenuated notion of
capacity? Certainly capacities can be left unrealized,
but if there is no possibility that they could ever be
developed, what sense is there in claiming that the
capacity is present? I see no reason to accept the
notion that there can be unrealizable capacities.
Is Speciesism Defensible?

Perhaps Cohen would agree that severely
retarded humans lack the capacity for moral agency
but thinks this is unimportant. He may be arguing
that we should treat the severely retarded as human
beings and that since human beings have rights
(presumably because many of them are moral
agents), severely retarded humans have rights as
well. On this reading, Cohen is suggesting that we
treat individuals according to their biological kind
and ignore their individual characteristics. Moral
status is to be determined by species membership,
not individual qualities. This is "speciesism": the
view that species membership is by itself a morally
differ
legitimate reason for treating individuals differently.
Peter Singer and others have argued that
objec
speciesism is "a form of prejudice no less objectionable than racism or sexism."4 Cohen's speciesist
perspective concerning the moral status of animals
vis-a-vis humans does coincide uncomfortably with
the outlook of racists and sexists towards blacks and
women. Both judge according to class membership
while ignoring individual qualities.
Cohen responds to this charge of speciesism by
embracing it:

Cohen seems to be claiming that the capacity for
moral agency is essential to human beings and is
necessarily lacking in other animals. Thus, severely
retarded humans, because they are human, retain
the capacity for moral agency even in their
retarded state. Animals by their very nature lack
this capacity. Since the capacity for moral agency
confers rights, severely retarded humans have
rights, whereas animals do not.
But many severely retarded humans could never
carry out even the quasi-moral functions that some
animals can perform. Dogs, for example, can be
obedient, protective, and solicitous, while there are
severely retarded humans who could not achieve
these minimal moral abilities despite our best
efforts. Given this fact, it just is not plausible to
claim that severely retarded humans have the
capacity for moral agency, while claiming that psy
psychologically sophisticated animals do not. Cohen
certainly has not given us any reason to accept this
claim. He simply assumes that being a member of a
biological species guarantees that one has certain
capacities, despite overwhelming evidence that
marginal members of species often lack capacities
normal for that kind of creature. We need a strong
argument before we should reject the obvious point
that some animals have a greater capacity for moral
behavior (however minimal) than do some severely
retarded human beings.
Cohen might argue that severely retarded
humans have the capacity for moral agency despite
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I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely
plausible; it is essential for right conduct,
because those who will not make the morally
relevant distinctions among species are almost
certain, in consequence, to misapprehend
their true obligations. The analogy between
speciesism and racism is insidious. Every
sensitive moral judgment requires that the
differing natures of the beings to whom
obligations are owed be considered. (p. 867)
This passage defends the truism that there often
are differences between members of distinct species
which are morally relevant in determining how we
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The analogy between speciesism and racism or
sexism is deficient in one respect. Species classification marks broader differences between beings
than does racial or sexual classification. Thus
attempting to justify differential treatment on the
basis of species membership alone (as Cohen
does) is not just as morally objectionable as doing
so on the basis of race or sex, since members of
different species are more likely to require differential treatment than are members of different
races or sexes (within a species). For example, in
determining what sort of food or shelter to
provide, it would be much more important to
know a creature's species than it would be to
know a person's race or sex.
But this does not imply that difference in
species by itself is a morally legitimate reason for
treating individuals differently, while difference in
race or sex considered by itself is not. Arguing
that a woman should be prohibited from combat
because of her sex fails to provide a morally relevant reason for the recommendation. Arguing
for this on the grounds that this woman lacks the
required physical capacities is to provide a morally
relevant reason. Similarly, arguing that a chimpanzee should be experimentally sacrificed rather
than a human, simply because it is a chimpanzee,
gives no morally relevant reason for the recommendation. However, arguing that the chimpanzee does not value or plan for its future ~ife to
the extent that the human does is to provide such
a reason.
Thus even though considerations of species are
frequently more closely correlated with morally
relevant features than are considerations of race
or sex, species membership by itself (like racial or
sexual class membership) is not a morally legitimate reason for differential treatment.
Speciesism is thus a moral mistake of the same
sort as racism and sexism: it advocates differential
treatment on morally illegitimate grounds.
The illegitimacy of judgments based on species
membership alone becomes especially clear when
comparing the moral status of a severely retarded
human with that of psychologically sophisticated
animals, since here the individual does not have
what most members of the species have. The
morally relevant differences which usually exist
between individuals of two different biological

should treat them. But this is not what is at issue in
the debate over speciesism. Singer, Regan, and
other opponents of speciesism are not suggesting
that we ignore morally relevaI).t differences
between members of different species and treat
them all identically. (They are not suggesting, for
example, that dogs be allowed at the dinner table
or be allowed to vote.) What rejecting speciesism
commits one to is being unwilling to use difference
in species by itself as a reason for treating individuals differently. Similarly, rejecting racism and
sexism commits one to not using race or sex by
itself as a reason for differential treatment. Cohen's
truism does not support speciesism in this problematic sense.

U

nless Cohen can show us
that there is some morally

relevant difference between
severely retarded humans and
psychologically sophisticated
animals, his position is open to the
following objection: if experimenting
on severely retarded humans is a
violation of their rights, then
experimenting on psychologically
sophisticated animals violates their
rights, as well.
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kinds (and hence which would frequently justity
com
treating them differently) are lacking when comparing severely retarded humans with psychologi
psychologically sophisticated animals. Any plausible morally
relevant characteristic - whether it be rationality,
self-sufficiency, ability to communicate, free
sophisti
choice, moral agency, psychological sophistication, fullness of life, and so on - is possessed by
some animals to a greater exten t than by some
severely retarded humans. In this case, to classity
by biological kind and to argue for differential
treatment on that basis alone obscures and
ignores morally relevant features rather than
relying on them. We should not treat individuals
on the basis of group or kind membership when
their individual characteristics are readily
apparent and relevan t.
Thus, Cohen's argument fails on this second
interpretation, as well. His appeal to biological
kind to justity differential moral status of severely
sophisti
retarded humans and psychologically sophisticated animals is an unjustified form of speciesism.
Unless Cohen can show us that there is some
morally relevan t difference between severely
sophisti
retarded humans and psychologically sophisticated animals, his position is open to the following
objection: if experimenting on severely retarded
experi
humans is a violation of their rights, then experimenting on psychologically sophisticated animals
violates their rights, as well.

Cohen rejects the utilitarian critic's position that
the like interests of humans and animals should be
given equal moral weight. He denies that similar
amounts of human and animal pain are equally
morally significant.
The first error is the assumption, often
explicitly defended, that all sentient animals
have equal moral standing. Between a dog and
a human being, according to this view, there is
no moral difference; hence the pains suffered
by dogs must be weighed no differently from
the pains suffered by humans.... If all forms of
animate life ... must be treated equally, and if
therefore in evaluating a research program the
pains of a rodent count equally with the pains
ofa human, we are forced to conclude (1)
that neither humans nor rodents possess
rights, or (2) that rodents possess all the rights
that humans possess.... One or the other must
be swallowed if the moral equality of all
species is to be defended. (p. 867)
This argument misses the mark. To claim that
animals "'have equal moral standing" and should
have their like interests treated equally implies
neither that there are no moral differences
between humans and animals nor that we should
treat animals in the same manner that we do
humans.
From the utilitarian position that the right act is
the one which maximizes the net satisfaction of
interests it follows that it is morally preferable to
give a human a slightly less amount of pain than to
give an animal a slightly greater amount of pain
(or vice versa). If the pains are of equal intensity
and consequence, then one should be morally
indifferen t. The fact that one is the pain of a
human and the other is the pain of an animal is
not by itself morally relevant.
This is not to say that the same type of experexper
iment on a human and an animal would cause
each the same amount of pain and suffering and
that we should be indifferent to which being we
use. Giving a typical chimpanzee a deadly virus in
order to test a v~ccine is likely to cause less pain
and suffering than giving a typical human the
psy
deadly virus for the same purpose. The greater psychological sophistication of the human, its greater
intelligence and self-consciousness, makes possible

Does Utilitarianism Iustify Animal
Experimentation?
Utilitarians hold that the right policy is the one
whose consequences maximize the satisfaction of
interests. In this calculation the in terests of all
affected parties are fairly taken in to accoun t.
Utilitarians who oppose animal experimentation
do so not on the grounds that animal rights are
violated but because they think that the overall
suffi
good resulting from these experiments is not sufficient to justify their negative consequences. The
benefits which result from animal experimentation
(such as an increase in scientific and medical
knowledge) either do not outweigh the costs (e.g.,
animal pain and death) or could be achieved in a
less costly fashion.
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Cohen can reach this conclusion only by abanaban
doning utilitarianism (and its principle of equal
consideration of like interests), by adopting the
speciesist position which treats animal pain and disdis
tress as insignificant when it is a means to human
benefit, and by being overly pessimistic about the
possibility of alternatives to animal use.

a greater degree of pain and suffering.
(Sometimes the reverse is true, however. 5)
Even though pain and suffering would often be
minimized by experimenting on an animal instead
of a typical human, that does not show that we may
morally discount the pain and suffering of animals.
We must still count the pain and suffering of
animals equally with the like pain and suffering of
humans. But in cases where a human will suffer
more, we should prefer the use of animals (and
vice versa) .
Cohen is thus mistaken in thinking that giving
equal consideration to the like interests of animals
and humans makes moral discriminations between
the two impossible. For a utilitarian, equal considconsid
eration (or equal moral standing) does not imply
identical treatment. Cohen has given us no cogent
reason for rejecting the view that the like pains of
humans and animals must be given equal moral
weight. Since the pain of the animals on whom we
experiment cannot be discounted, Cohen's utiliutili
tarian justification for the biomedical use of
animals becomes far more difficult to achieve.
Cohen argues that even if "the pains of all
animate beings must be counted equally" (p. 868),
a utilitarian calculus would still come out in
support of the biomedical use of animals:

The Possibility of Substitution
Whether research using living creatures is
justified on utilitarian grounds depends in large
part on the availability of substitute procedures. A
utilitarian benefit/cost analysis (which must
consider alternative, less costly ways to achieve
these benefits) would find that some, perhaps
many but certainly not all experimen ts, using
animals are morally justifiable. Some use of living
beings continues to be necessary and justifiable.
Even developing alternatives to the biomedical use
of animals often requires the use of animals. At
present substitute techniques are not sufficiently
developed to eliminate this use entirely (and they
may never be).6
Nevertheless, Cohen is overly pessimistic about
the possibility of alternatives to the current
biomedical use of animals. His speciesism prevents
him from appreciating or even acknowledging the
numerous substitute procedures that are being
developed. A recent report by the U.S. Congress'
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) on alteralter
natives to animal use in research, testing, and eduedu
cation is much more encouraging about the
potential for alternatives. 7 This study presents
numerous suggestions involving the replacement,
reduction, and refinement of the use of animals. In
addition to the promising techniques of in vitro
experimentation and computer simulation (which
Cohen mentions), the OTA report suggests:

The sum of the benefits of their use is
utterly beyond quantification. The
elimination of horrible disease, the
increase oflongevity, the avoidance of
great pain, the saving oflives, and the
improvement of the quality oflives (for
humans and for animals) achieved
through research using animals is so
incalculably great that the argument of
these critics, systematically pursued,
establishes not their conclusion but its
reverse: to refrain from using animals in
biomedical research is, on utilitarian
grounds, morally wrong. (p. 868)

(1) Coordinating investigations and sharing
information (to reduce duplicative experiments
when unnecessary for validating the original
research) ;

Substantial benefits have resulted (and continue
to result) from biomedical experimentation, much
of which involves the use of animals. And although
a utilitarian benefit/cost analysis would reach the
conclusion that it would be wrong to stop the use
of animals entirely, it would not justity Cohen's call
for an increase in the biomedical use of animals.
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(2) Replacing the use of higher animals with
lower animals (invertebrates for vertebrates and
cold-blooded for warm-blooded animals);
(3) Using plants instead of animals;
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(4) Sharing animals (e.g., getting several tissues
from one animal);

and articles have persuasively documented that
many experiments using animals have been unprofessional, of dubious scientific merit, repetitive, or
cruel. 12 Two video tapes are especially persuasive;
"Unnecessary Fuss," about head injury research
involving baboons at the University of
Pennsylvania,l~and "Tools For Research," a general
review of research using animals over the last
twenty years.I 4 The flurry of recent legislation concerning animal welfare cited above shows a growing
public recognition of the misuse of laboratory
animals. Government regulations for the care of
laboratory animals have been developed to prevent
these sorts of experiments, as well.I 5 Cohen's suggestion that we encourage the wide and imaginative
use of live animal subjects, instead of limiting this
use and working to 'find substitute techniques,
shows blatant disregard for this widely acknowledged problem.

(5) Designing experiments which use statistical
inferences and whose design provides reliable
information despite the use of fewer animals;
(6) Decreasing the pain and distress in animal
experimentation by altering the experimental
design and by using anesthetics and tranquilizers;

(7) Using non-living chemical and physical
systems that mimic biological functions;
(8) Using human and animal cadavers; and
(9) Teaching by demonstration instead of by
individual student use of animals.

Recent amendments to the Animal Welfare Acts
and the Public Health Service Act,9 as well as legislation concerning the education of health professionals,lO all encourage alternatives to the current
methods of animal use. l l Cohen's pessimistic
assessment of these alternatives flies in the face of a
growing trend of using already existing alternatives
and of developing new substitute procedures.
Experiments which cause animals pain, distress, or
death are clearly not justifiable when such substitute procedures are available.
Should We Increase Biomedical Animal Use?
Cohen argues that in order to achieve maximum
safety for humans "the wide and imaginative use of
live animal subjects should be encouraged rather
than discouraged" (p. 869). Cohen is right that
some experiments which subject humans to risk
could be conducted using animals without loss in
the significance of the results. Furthermore, risky
experiments which are necessary should be performed on psychologically less sophisticated creatures. An increase in psychological sophistication
brings with it a wider range of interests, a greater
ability to experience satisfaction (and dissatisfaction), and the possibility of leading a fuller life.
Inflicting suffering or death on these creatures
causes greater harm.
In advocating an increase in the biomedical use
of animals Cohen not only ignores the available
alternatives but disregards the widespread experimental misuse of animals, as well. Numerous books
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consistently advocate the limited use of animals in
other areas, as well. Both extremes - the absolute
prohibition of all animal use, as well as Cohen's
speciesist encouragement of such use - should be
avoided.

Can A Consistent Position Concerning Animal Use

Be Developed?
Cohen charges his anti-speciesist opponents with
inconsistency or absurdity: "Scrupulous vegetarivegetari
anism, in matters of food, clothing, shelter, comcom
merce, and recreation, and in all other spheres, is
the only fully coherent position the critic may
adopt" (p. 869). The person who eats veal and then
strenuously objects to the killing of cats in relatively
painless medical experiments is inconsistent. We
do not need to eat animals for food (certainly not
mammals); carefully chosen vegetarian diets are
perfectly healthy. We do need the ongoing results
of biomedical research, and for some of this
research the use of living creatures continues to be
required.
Cohen is right that the use of animals in
biomedical research is less difficult to defend than
are other uses of animals. (Only one out of every
hundred animals used is for this purpose.I 6 ) But
the anti-speciesist critic of current biomedical uses
of animals need not be committed to prohibiting
all uses of animals. Since anti-speciesism allows for
discriminating between animals, critics can consisconsis
con
tently object to the raising, slaughtering, and consumption of veal calves while not objecting to
commercial shrimp farming and shrimp concon
sumption. A critic might also object to repeated
surgery on healthy animals in the training ofveteriofveteri
narians and not object to the use of chick embryos
for toxicity testing. The recommendation that
experimenters substitute cold-blooded animals for
warm-blooded ones or invertebrates for vertebrates
is also perfectly consistent. These suggestions are
not speciesist, since species membership per se is
not the justification offered for differential
treatment. Differences in the fullness of life, in psypsy
chological sophistication, and in the capacity for
suffering are what motivates these suggestions.
Thus, one can argue for limiting animal use in
biomedical research without embracing the
extreme position prohibiting all uses of any
animals for whatever reason. Cohen can successsuccess
fully saddle only his most extreme opponents with
this consequence. A more circumspect skepticism
about the legitimacy of a significant portion of lablab
oratory animal use is possible. Advocates of limlim
iting the use of animals in biomedical research can
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A Test Biomedical Researchers Should Use
I have suggested that it would be morally
preferable, ceteris paribus, to give a deadly virus to
an animal rather than to a typical human being.
The pain, suffering, and distress caused by the two
experiments, as well as the significance of the loss
of life, would be minimized by experimenting on
the animal. However, this argument in support of
the experimental use of animals rather than typical
humans does not give us a reason for preferring
animal experimentation to "marginal case" human
experimentation. Since many animals (e.g., chimchim
panzees) and severely retarded humans would suffer
equally from such an experiment, the pain and disdis
tress of the experimental subject gives us no reason
to prefer the use of one to the other. Furthermore,
given their rough equivalence in psychological
sophistication, the value of the two creatures' lives
is about the same. Whatever moral rights such creacrea
tures have, if any, are also comparable.
Thus, an important test to determine if an
experiment is signifIcant enough to justify the
pain, suffering, and (perhaps) death of the
creature involved is to ask the following question:
Would the investigator still think the experiment
justifiable if it were performed on a severely
retarded human at a comparable psychological
level as the animal? If not, then the experiment
should not be conducted. Only an arbitrary prefpref
erence for members of our own species could avoid
this conclusion.
If this test were used, and I am arguing that it is
the appropriate test, many - though certainly not
all - experiments on animals would cease and be
replaced by alternatives. Biomedical researchers
would do well to keep this test in mind.I7
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